We left off earlier with the point that the U.S. is weak at accessing information from human sources. This is especially problematic when success at war depends on information access superiority, and much of the information the U.S. needs is only available from human sources.
I began my independent research three years ago with the idea that the the U.S. government, especially the CIA, was ineffective at human intelligence. It turn out that the failures of the CIA at human intelligence could fill an entire bookshelf (literally, check out my living room.)
There was little new insight that I could add on the subject of the CIA's performance at human intelligence. I did, however, notice a trend of individuals who have excelled at gaining information access on human networks. Gary Schroen in Afghanistan, Donald Nichols in the Korean War, Orde Wingate in 1930's Palestine during the Arab revolt, Rita Katz in the pre-9/11 United States, and Ali Soufan in the FBI were my original sources of inspiration.
What do these people have in common? To what can we ascribe their success?
I classify what these individuals did as Human Network Operations(HNO).
HNO are designed to gain information access and influence over external human networks.
Successful Human network operators have four key qualities in common:
1. Linguistic and Cultural expertise - Language is the main way that human beings convey information, and culture is the context in which this process occurs. Not to mention that one is unlikely to develop trusting relationships with people if he does not speak their language and understand their culture.
2. Long term missions. It takes years to build the relationships necessary for successful HNO. If you wait until you need the information to start the HNO, it's already too late. See the Iraq War for corroboration.
3. Decentralized organizational structures - Successful HNO's will not be centrally-controlled and micromanaged. There is no way that a headquarters can understand fully what is happening on the ground. In addition, frequent communication is often very difficult in places like Waziristan and Somalia.
4. Highly self-motivated - The most successful human network operators all possess great internal drive. People do not succeed in decentralized organizations unless they are able to work hard even when no boss is watching. Also, the extreme sacrifices (long time away from home, risk of death, years studying a foreign language and culture) necessary for HNO to work demand a very high level of motivation.
We can also divide HNO into two categories: cooperative and antagonistic.
1. Cooperative - Here the aim is to build relationships with an external human network in order to cooperate towards a common end. Consider Gary Schroen developing close ties with the Northern Alliance over a couple decades. These relationships paid off after 9/11 when the U.S. was able to use the Northern Alliance as source of intelligence and ally in the war for Afghanistan.
2. Antagonistic - In antagonistic HNO, the goal is to weaken or destroy an enemy network. The human network operator can accomplish this by infiltrating the network itself, or recruiting assets in the network or the surrounding community who can provide information on the enemy network. For example, Orde Wingate built a network of informers in the Arab communities of Palestine which he then used as sources of information for special operations targetted against the Arab revolt.
Future posts will address this subject in depth, dealing specifically with both antagonistic and cooperative HNO, as well as discussing the practical application of HNO against international criminal and terrorist networks.
Further research:
Rita Katz - "Terrorist Hunter"
Gary Schroen - "First In"
Christopher Sykes - "Orde Wingate: a Biography"
John Bierman and Colin Smith - "Fire in the Night"
Lawrence Wright - "The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11"
Bob Baer - "See No Evil"
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