Nicholas Kristof on Pakistan

 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/23/opinion/23kristof.html?ex=1385096400&en=668dafe7583e0202&ei=5124&partner=facebook&exprod=facebook 

Read the article.  Post thoughts to comments.

Possible areas of focus:

1. How effective is humanitarian development as a counterterrorism measure?

2. Is a lack of education really at the root of Islamic extremist violence?

3. Does it make sense to keep funding the Pakistani government at the level the U.S. recently has been?

Comments

[internogc]

Kristof makes some excellent points, most notably that funding Pakistan's military with a practically blank check is absolutely not in US interests.

However, I believe that Kristof overemphasizes the potential value of education on its own. Ignorance does not drive terrorism. (Recall that the planners and hijackers of 9/11 had all achieved educational goals far surpassing middle school or high school.) Terrorism is a tactic embraced by people in a strategically inferior position when faced with a conventionally strong adversary.

In practical terms, I see lack of opportunity as the number one underlying factor for terrorism, and terrorism that arises in Islamic and Arab countries in particular. A feeling of cultural impotence, an inability to take part in the globalized economy, and the opportunistic hijacking of religious doctrine by a few hateful individuals are the incubating conditions for takfiri/salafi groups.

Humanitarian aid or education initiatives are admirable and necessary endeavors, but are by no means sufficient. Of Kristof's prescriptions, then, I would emphasize peace in Kashmir and providing legitimate jobs for Pakistanis as more essential than education. The former undermines the political rallying point for many Pakistanis, and the latter would open a viable option for the young men and women who are being convinced that the Taliban and the like represent their only future.

[dbaz87]

Steve Coll recently wrote about the Taliban's (and their emulators) growing enroachment into Pakistan's Punjabi-controlled, traditaionlly independent and free areas, mainly the media.
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/stevecoll/2008/11/the-climate-in.html
Kristof is correct to say that the US must be concerned with educating young Pakistanis to, above all, be able to read, learn from and contribute to free expression. We should further be making sure that these kids are learning more than the militant chapters of the Koran. Additionally, exposing kids and their teachers to Americans will help lesson the prosepcts for tension and US-hatred.

Unfortunately, Kristof fails to recognize that the US cannot just substitute "Books for Bombs." It must provide lots of books and kill people when necessary.

[internogc]

It's also important to explicitly identify different problems, so that they can be addressed with different (appropriate) solutions.

Problem 1: there are terrorists out there who will not be dissuaded.
Solution 2: Achieve information access superiority, enable offensive operations.

Problem 2: Prevailing social and economic conditions in many parts of the world contribute to increasing the numbers of people from problem 1.
Solution 2: Find the right mix of social and economic programs to change conditions so that people are diverted from becoming terrorists.

[Alex @ Insurgent Consciousness]

I would like to further complicate the issue by bringing up one of my favorite articles on terrorism, "The Seven Habits of Highly Ineffective Terrorists" by Bruce Schneier:

http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/10/the_seven_habit.html

There, he explaines how terrorist behavior shows that political motivations, such as a desire for a better life, free elections, opportunity, etc, are not the primary appeals of terrorism. If they were, would down-trodden people so often turn to terrorism as a first, rather than last, resort? Why would they insist on killing civilians to get their message across? Why do they resist disbanding even when certain needs are met? He goes into much more detail than this, and it's worth a read.

Therefore the idea that reducing unemployment and anger or conflict about Kashmir, for example, will satisfy potential terrorists and make them peacefull is flawed. That does not necessarily refute the conclusion, however, as these measures may reduce terrorism by other means.

Someone with a family, a job, and a place in society is not only less likely to turn to terror because he has something to lose, but also simply because he will be busy working, raising his children, and, when problems arise, protesting and lobbying. There are, of course, exceptions, but this trend becomes even more prominent when you consider how many young, new jihadis are more thugs than idealists, equal parts gangsters and extremists. Reducing gangsterism, disenfranchisement, the need for alternative social bonds and structures that terrorist groups are so keen to provide would no doubt also reduce, though not remove, the appeal of terrorism.

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I posted this article because I do not see the evidence for the idea that education or economic opportunities will decrease the likelihood that someone will become a terrorist.

This study confirms my hypothesis :http://www.krueger.princeton.edu/terrorism2.pdf

Nearly every terrorist I have ever studied has been educated, upper middle class, and turned down other alternatives to become a terrorist.

Education may actually facilitate large scale terrorist attacks. The most successful terrorist operatives tend to be engineers, for obvious reasons.

Furthermore, the ideologies that motivate terrorism are more accessible to the intelligent than the ignorant. They require knowledge of history, current events, and religion, for example.

Here are a few highly educated terrorists:

http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/news/article-23402548-details/Two%20doctors%20held%20over%20bomb%20attacks/article.do

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1556553/45-Muslim-doctors-planned-US-terror-raids.html

Others include Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ayman Al Zawahiri, Osama Bin Laden, Mohammed Atta, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Abu Musab al Suri, and many many more.

[internogc]

@Russ -

What do you believe are the causes of terrorism? Is there a strategy that can "divert" someone from becoming a terrorist?

I think that when you say that education / economic opportunities do not decrease the likelihood of someone becoming a terrorist, you are conflating two separate problems.

On the one hand, it is true that a small number of highly educated, highly motivated, extremely angry people are "lost" to terrorism - i.e. they are committed to a destructive cause. Stopping them is impossible, short of conducting HNO and capturing or killing them.

On the other hand, one of the factors that most empowers these individuals is their ability to operate in an environment (both conceptual and physical) that either tacitly or actively supports them. The upper-middle class, educated terrorists you identify are the venomous serpents that lurk in a swamp of extremism. Economic reform, social mobility, education, etc. are all the tools that drain the swamp. HNO and the further offensive operations it enables are the tools that kill the snakes; and it is easier to kill the snakes when the swamp is draining.

Reducing the popular support and limiting the wider social networks that approve of those individuals is key to hampering their ability to operate. Granted, a sufficiently motivated individual can still to significant damage. But they key to understanding the role of social programs in counter-terrorism is to parse the bigger problem into its significant components, as I have attempted to do above.

[Insurgent Consciousness]

What then, of the terrorists in Albany, and London, and Hamburg?

Terrorists are often radicalized while at Western universities, since the universities provide both a sense of alienation from the rest of the world, and a link into Islamist networks.

Terrorists are in miserable places like Chechnya and Pakistan with lots of popular support, sure, but they are also in the richest areas of the world. What defines a safehaven is not geography or the presence of lots of sympathizers, but security from the enemy's intelligence and military. Unfortunately, such safehavens are often found in the West, with or without approving masses.

How, exactly, are the illiterate, impoverished masses, of use to Al Qaeda?

If you are going to talk about AQ in Iraq, I consider that more to be an insurgency than a terrorist campaign. The tactics that both sides use in an insurgency are very different.