Objective vs. Subjective Security

Today's post comes courtesy of Abu Naqash.  Abu Naqash is in many ways the emodiment of the future of security: a multilingual, physically fit, highly motivated, and creative individual.  He speaks Russian and Arabic, among several other languages, and has dedicated himself to Crossfit training.  Abu Naqash prefers for various reasons to post under an alias, rather than his real name.  Many of those involved in ICon feel similarly; do not let the use of these nicknames distract you from evaluating their contributions on the basis of individual merit.   

The ultimate goal of counter-insurgency/counter-terrorism operations is to increase security. It is worthwhile therefore to take some time and think clearly about what it means to be secure. 

In an objective sense, it is difficult to know precisely how secure you are. There is no single thing you can measure or count. At best, objective security - how safe you actually are - is only relative. At any given moment, you may be more or less likely to suffer harm. Compare this to a more subjective definition of security: how safe you feel. Your subjective security is what determines how you live your life daily and what your overall quality of life is.  But at the same time, how safe you feel and may only be loosely related to how safe you really are. It is easy to imagine someone who feels safe when they are actually in imminent danger (false confidence), or alternatively someone who lives in constant fear for their life when they are in fact quite unlikely to be harmed (paranoia).

Insurgent and terrorist operations directly affect a narrow target's objective security to undermine a wider audience's subjective security. A relatively small number of people are killed in a single attack, but a much larger number see the television coverage and worry about their own safety. A terrorist attack is successful not only based on its immediate cost in life and property damage, but also its wider effects on the economy, habits, and reactions of the overall target.

Human Network Operations increase information access, and through this it improves our ability to attack human networks such as terrorist organizations. By increasing what we know, we enable effective offensive operations. However, this process by its nature focuses on objective security.

Given the importance of subjective security, how can HNO be combined with other measures in a comprehensive security doctrine?

Post thoughts to comments.

Comments

[Russ@ICon]

Abu Naqash is entirely correct in emphasizing the importance of subjective security.

My primary concern is the way in which subjective security often harms objective security.

Someone who feels safe will be less likely to take the difficult measures necessary to become safe.

As Ben Franklin said: "The way to be safe is never to be secure."

Human Network Operations are very hard to sell politically. If they work, most likely no one knows about them. They do not please any special interest groups.

Contrast HNO with fighter jets. Fighter jets are quantifiable and tangible. They are built by American defense contractors, often designed so that every state has a role in producing a different part of the plane, so politicians love them as pork-barrel projects.

We have not yet answered the question: How do you sell long-term counter-terrorism to the public?

How will the average American understand this war in a way that he or she will be willing to make necessary sacrifices?

This war has no clearly defined enemy, its most important successes are often unknown, and it will continue indefinitely.

[Alex @ Insurgent Consciousness]

Abu Naqash is right about the power and value of subjective security. The great thing is that it works both ways. Even with Information Access Superiority gained through HNO and the resulting operations, doing sufficent damage to terrorist organizations to really hurt their objective security is difficult. Constant recruitment, small operational requirements (remember what 19 guys and $500,000 could do?), and a martyr mentality makes even substantial drops in objective security acceptable for these organizations.

Well planned SpecOps and other offensive strikes can, however, demolish subjective security. Imagine what happens to morale when mid-level commanders are being taken out mysteriously in the dead of night with no battle, no gunfight, no glory? Or how about plans being foiled miserably before they have a chance to "terrorize" anyone? Fear hurts recruiting, as most would first be heros isntead of martyrs, and nothing frightens even martyrs more than failure, embarrassment, and a dishonorable death or life imprisonment.

For both sides, the War on Terrorism is largely a war of subjective security.

[Hauss]

Russ, to take your statement one step further, how are we going to ensure the subjective security of the public if a shift from "fighter jets" to HNO occurs? Since HNO is by necessity clandestine, how will the average American feel safe without what they deem a measurable and significant security presence?
And more on the subject of Alex's post, I believe that one of the biggest challenges in the current conflict is the insulation of our enemies against bad news; while every one of us is told every day by news networks how many Marines were killed in an ambush in Iraq, the cell-based organizational structure of networks such as Al Qaeda prevents successful breaches of their objective security from effecting their overall subjective security.
Easy access to bad news is unfortunately inextricably linked to a state of information access superiority. This balance that must be struck between confining our enemies to information access inferiority and allowing select intel through to lower their subjective security highlights the need for truly effective HNOs in today's conflicts.