Security South of the Border

Note: I wanted to find some really good pictures, but when I searched for Los Zetas all I that I found was Mexican music videos and sorority girls. This is what information access inferiority feels like.

In case anyone has not noticed, things aren't going so well in Mexico right now.  Blatant disregard for the rule of law has prevailed to the point where the cartels are mailing the heads of their victims to police stations in ice boxes and an estimated 4300 people have died because of the drug trade. Just south of the American border we can see one of the great triumphs of international crime, narcotics, and non-state actors in the Western Hemisphere. Of course the kidnapping and execution of a five year old child is not, according to our news media, worthy of the same prime time coverage as Sarah Palin's wardrobe, but such epic state failure in controlling international criminal networks deserves some analysis.
 
Any new development in the Mexican crime drama points strongly to the information access inferiority of the government due to very successful human network operations on the part of the drug cartels. Just a few days ago, the former top Mexican drug official was arrested for allegedly taking bribes in return for tipping off the very cartels he was tasked to defeat. Another few days prior, the head of Mexico's Interpol office was arrested for similar charges, leading Interpol to believe that their communications and databases have been compromised.
 
This picture gets even clearer when we look at the gangs and their tactics. One group, Los Zetas, was founded by Mexican Special Forces officers who had previous experience spearheading Mexico's war on drugs.  This organization has filled its ranks with former and current police and military and now acts as the primary security force for the Gulf Cartel. Imagine where the U.S. would be if the Navy SEALs left and joined al Qaeda. 

The Zetas employ both cutting-edge combat and intelligence tactics. A recent raid on one of their many arsenals found not only hundreds of assault riffles and half a million bullets but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft weaponry and police uniforms. To maintain information access superiority, they hire kids on bicycles that ride around the street and whistle to give away police positions, put wiretaps on potential targets, and pay prostitutes to spy on their clients. To prevent potential leaks or infiltration, they have arranged themselves as networks of cells in direct contrast to the Mexican government's centralized bureaucracy. The Zetas know all about information access superiority, human network operations, special operations, and, judging by the heads-in-ice-boxes I alluded to earlier, both subjective and objective security.
 
Unless someone deals with this issue soon, we may have another Colombia as our neighbor.

How can this situation be reversed?

Post thoughts to comments.

Comments

[Russ@ICon]

It's important to understand what counter-narcotics policy can't do. As long as people in the U.S. want drugs, drugs will enter the U.S.

Counter-drug measures tend to dictate HOW the arrive, and WHO profits.

For example, in Colombia, the FARC has been severely weakened, with no correspondent decrease in the drug trade. Rather than the traditional FARC-controlled, North-bound cocaine route, a new Venezuela to West Africa to Europe route has opened up, with new businessmen making money off of it.

Similarly, the prominence of Mexico in drug trafficking routes comes due to an increase in efforts to patrol the Caribbean drug routes.

As Douglas Farah says, "Water runs down hill, seeking the path of least resistance. This is exactly how drugs flow."

If we block one route (north through the caribbean), the drug networks will find another route with less resistance (such as Venezuela where Chavez's government is doing very little to stop the drug trade.)

That said, effective counter-narcotics action can do two things:

1. Make sure that we know who's profiting, and where the money is going. When billions are being made, that kind of money can buy a lot of anything: guns, bombs, political power, etc.

2. Prevent the criminal networks from developing large sanctuaries of impunity and prevent them from gaining political control of territory. I consider the FARC example to be a tremendous success. Sure, the drug flow continued, but the FARC no longer has a safehaven the size of Switzerland from which to severely threaten the Colombian state, as it did several years ago. Ten years ago serious analysts were worried about Colombia falling to the FARC. Now we're talking about how to finish them off, and not become too complacent in our success.

[Andrew]

There is absolutely no reason for us to have information access inferiority in Mexico. Millions of Americans are from Central America and can speak Spanish. We have the tools, all we need to do is apply them correctly.

Although it takes years to lay the groundwork for HNO, it is likely that many Latin Americans living in the US have ties (family, business...etc) to social networks in Mexico.

On a tactical level we need to exploit these ties to build an effective platform for HNO.

Russ is correct about the strategic-level implications of the war on drugs. As long as people want to get high in the US, there will be money to be made off of drugs and that money is a primary motivation for drug traffickers. And, as Russ pointed, that money can be used for anything: from buying a yacht to buying a bomb.

[Alex @ Insurgent Consciousness]

Russ brings up a good point about the sanctuaries of impunity. A criminal safehaven in northern Mexico is the last thing we want. Our porous border would allow these rackets to operate freely in the United States then come back to Mexico where we cannot chase them. To an extent this may already be going on.

[Russ@ICon]

As Andrew pointed out, in theory, doing HNO in Mexico should not be very difficult for the US.

The only possible explanation I have for why it hasn't happened is a lack of understanding in Washington of how important the drug cartels are as a national security risk, not just as transporters of contraband.

We need to understand that all sanctuaries of impunity for international criminal and terrorist networks are serious national security risks.

It follows from that realization that we cannot afford such blatant information access inferiority just to the south of our border.

How do we deal with such dangerous apathy in Washington before it's too late?

[Andrew]

Unfortunately for the United States, its national security apparatus was designed in 1947 and it was organized to combat largely 3GW threats.

Effective HNO and IAS are way too innovative, creative, and cutting-edge for the bureaucracy at the Pentagon to grasp (let alone implement).

As a result of these paralyzing bureaucratic institutions, we are forced to look beyond state-centric measures of offense and defense (HNO/RC). The nation-state paradigm of international relations is in steady decline (see John Robb and Martin Van Crevald). It’s time we got our act together and see the world as it is.

[Alex @ Insurgent Consciousness]

John Robb, who writes about fourth generation warfare, or 4GW, which is assymetric warfare designed to get the enemy, often us, to lose their will to fight, can be found at http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/.

He recently had this to say about Mexico:
"Rich Mexicans spend more on bodyguards as security deteriorates. Excellent quote by a Mexican businessman: “One bodyguard, two bodyguards, even three of them can’t do anything with these criminals, who come in groups of 20 with high-powered arms. If they want to hunt you down, they will get you.” This is going to be a gold mine of an industry in the US by early in the next decade." and cited this article: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/17/world/americas/17mexico.html?_r=2&hp.

Titled "For Mexico's Wealthy, Cost of Living Includes Guards," it illustrates how much crime and kidnapping have become a part of life. The elites have to send their children to birthday parties with a full armed escort who hand the children off to the host's private security.