Balloon Part IV.

We often talk about the transnational nature of terrorism.  The fact that terrorism respects no national boundaries causes not just the tactical difficulties associated with operating in many different countries, but it also makes it more difficult for people to create effect strategies to counter it.  The American government, especially the military, wants to create national, or regional strategies, but unlike our strategies, Al Qaeda adheres to no such geographic limitations.

The drug trade here offers us a useful analogy with the balloon effect.  To borrow from a previous post:

In studying drug trafficking, analysts talk about a balloon effect.  The balloon effect holds that if you repress drug production in one country, say Colombia, then demand for the drug will cause production to increase in other areas, say Peru and Bolivia.  As long as the demand for the drug exists, suppliers will find a way to meet it. 

Terrorist groups are another example of the balloon effect  .  Operation Enduring Freedom disrupted Al Qaeda's safehaven in Afghanistan, but that was obviously not the end for Al Qaeda.  It regenerated a safehaven across the border in Pakistan, and stepped up its activities from Africa to Southeast Asia.  Al Qaeda is unlikely to run out of poorly governed areas in which to set up safehavens, nor of operatives willing to fight for its cause.

The important point here is that even SUCCESS in counter-terrorism may cause new problems elsewhere.  The US could achieve an ideal outcome in Af-Pak and still have a big Al Qaeda problem on its hands, just in other countries.  In fact, according to the Washington Post's source in the CIA, events might be heading in that direction:

Officials said it was largely because al-Qaeda has been decimated by Predator strikes in Pakistan that the franchise in Yemen has emerged as a more potent threat. A CIA strike killed a group of al-Qaeda operatives in Yemen in 2002, but officials said the agency has not had that capability on the peninsula for several years.

As we've covered earlier, the Al Qaeda focus on Yemen has caused the CIA and military much difficulty in building the intelligence networks they need to effectively target terrorists.  It seems to be much easier for Al Qaeda to shift focus regionally, than for DOD and CIA to re-target their intelligence, drone, and SOF programs. 

Af-pak is not the point.  To Al Qaeda it is a tool, just one possible safehaven of many, and the US should look at it that way as well.  The US counter-terrorism strategy should be aggressively transnational, and our policy makers must explain this strategy to the American public as well.  If American government entities aren't set up for this transnational task, then they should be adjusted accordingly. 

- Russ Greene

Comments

[Alex @ I-Con]

Good point. Andrew and I were talking about this. Until we know what the endgame is in Afghanistan, we don't know when we're done, and I think that the balloon effect makes an endgame difficult. Do we want to defeat specific networks or secure Afghanistan? The two are not the same.